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THE MICHIGAN JUDICATURE ACT OF 1915
I.
TH]

DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN LAW AND EQUITY PROCEEDINGS.

N 1848 a wave of reform in judicial procedure began to sweep
over the United States. In that year the legislature of New
York enacted the Code of Civil Procedure, a statute of farreaching importance, for it became the source of -and the model
for similar legislation in almost two-thirds of the States in the
Union.
In this act the distinctions between law and equity proceedings
received distinguished consideration, for the first article dealing
with civil actions opened with the sententious announcement that
"the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and the
forms of all such actions and suits heretofore existing, are abolished."1
Two years later, in 185o, a new constitution was adopted by the
people of the State of Michigan. That the New York Code of
Civil Procedure had meanwhile begun to exert an influence in this
State is very clear from an innovation introduced into that document, for in Article VI, Section 5, it was provided that "The Legislature shall as far as practicable, abolish distin'ctions between law
and equity proceedings."
Evidently there was a popular demand for a reform of the same
general character as that ifitroduced in New York, and the peoplethrough their constitution did all that peremptory language could
do to obtain suitable legislation on the subject. But the legislature
failed to carry out the people's mandate. Instead it sought to shift
the task upon the Supreme Court, and in 1851 a statute was passed
which provided that-"The Judges of the Supreme Court shall have
the power, and it shall be their duty, within three months after this
N. Y. Laws 1848, Ch. 379, § 62.
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law shall take effect, by general rules to establish, and from time to
time modify and amend, the practice in said Court and in the Circuit Courts, * * * and they 'shall, once at least in every two
years thereafter, if necessary, revise the said rules, with a view to
the attainment, so far as may be practicable, of the following improvements in the practice: i. The abolishing of the distinction's
2
between law and equity proceedings, as far as practicable."
passage
the
by
satisfied
-was
conscience
legislative
the
Probably
of this act, for nothing more was done by the legislature for more
than sixty years. Doubtless also the Supreme Court was not at all
disturbed by this gratuitous bequest from the legislature, for no response was vouchsafed by the court. For two-thirds of a century
the legislature has waited for the Supreme Court, and the Supreme
Court has waited for the legislature, and until the last session the
people failed to obtain relief, although the same demand for legislative action was repeated in the constitution of 19o8
In the judicature Act of 1915 the legislature at last took up the
matter. It did not in terms abolish all distinctions between legal
and equitable proceedings, as the New York Code had done. Its
language is much less sweeping and its immediate object much less
pretentious, but a brief survey of the results reached by the reforms
in New York and elsewhere will show that the modest provisions
of the Judicature Act have really covered a considerable part of
the available field of reform.
All that the constitution of 1850 provided for was an abolition of
the distinctions between law and equity proceedings as far as the
same should be practicable. It contemplated that it might be impracticable wholly to abolish them all. How far, then, is it practicable to remove-these distinctions?
As to Mode of Trial. It has not been practicable to abolish the
distinctions between trials at law and trials in equity. The Codes
have all undertaken to- abolish every distinction that could be abolished, and yet in every State which operates under the Code, trial
by the court in equity cases and trial by jury in law cases has remained, and so long as constitutional guarantees protect the right
of trial by jury this striking distinction cannot be erased.
As to Practice on Appeal. Since no jury intervenes in equity
cases, reversals on appeal do not ordinarily result in new trials, and
the appellate court can itself pass upon the correctness of the conclusions drawn below as to matters of fact. This distinction cannot
be abolished under modern constitutional guarantees.
2

ILaws of 1851, p. zo6.
'Const. Art. VII, § 5.
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As to the Relief Granted. Courts of law give judgments for damages or for the recovery of specific real or personal property. Courts
of equity give specific relief of many kinds, such as enjoining unlawful acts, compelling the performance of contracts, reforming instruments, setting aside fraudulent conveyances, quieting titles, etc.
The distinctions between the two kinds of relief cannot be abolished,
nor has it ever been found practicable to abolish the old 'rule that
the remedies of equity cannot be obtained unless the remedies of
the law are inadequate. That rule is as firmly intrenched under
Code practice as it ever was at common law. The greatest American
writer upon the Code and its most able defender admits that the
"abolition of the distinction between legal and equitable
actions,
and of the forms of legal actions, does not abolish the distinctions
between remedies. If from the nature of the primary right, and
of the wrong by which it is invaded, the injured party would under
the old system have been entitled to an equitable remedy, he is still
entitled to the same relief, and it may well be termed equitable; if
from the like causes he would have been entitled to a legal remedy,
he is still entitled to the same relief, and it may properly be described as legal."'
As to Parties to Actions. Common law courts recognized only
joint and several rights and liabilities. The cases of which the common law courts took jurisdiction were those wherein all the parties
on 6ach side formed a homogeneous group capable of being treated
as a unit. Generally speaking, the judgment went for or against
the entire group, and this resulted largely from. the fact that the
cases falling under the jurisdiction of the common law courts were
simple so far as they involved the interrelation of parties. A single
right enjoyed by one or more plaintiffs, was predicated on the breach
of a single duty resting on one or more defendants.
But in equity parties were not so rigidly classified. Equitable
controversies covered a wider range, involved various duties resting in varying degrees upon different parties, were not looked upon
as always two-sided but as many-sided, each party or group of parties sustain more or less complicated interrelations with other individual parties or groups. In cases of this kind the simple and rigid
conceptions of joint and several rights and duties, which formed the
basis of common law procedure respecting the joinder and nonjoinder of parties, were clearly inapplicable, and a wholly different
notion of the relations of parties to litigated controversies was necessary. In this way there grew up an entirely different practice in
equity respecting the matter of parties. It was not accidental, but
4 Pomeroy on Code Remedies

(4th

d.) 14.
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followed as a necessary consequence of the intricacies of equitable
relations. •These rules of practice respecting parties must be employed'in equitable actions; but they are unnecessary in actions at
law. Many of the liberal rules of equity, if they wer6 to be made
universal, wouid seldom if ever be resorted to in legal actions. A
court of last resort sitting in a Code State recently said: "'Equitable
doctrines with respect to parties and judgments are wholly unlike
those which prevail at common law-different in their fundamental
conceptions, in their practical operations, in their adaptability to
circumstances and in their results upon the rights and duties of
litigants." 5 Distinctions between things that are different cannot
be abolished even by statutory language which expressly undertakes to do so.
As to Pleadings. There are fundamental differences between
causes of action in equity and causes of action at law. The nature
'of the showing necessary to obtain relief in equity is different from
that which discloses a right to a judgment for damages. Legal
causes of -action are reducible to a few material elements. Each
part is essential, and to omit one is as fatal as to omit all. A material issue can be raised by the denial of any one. The elements
making up the cause of action at law are like links in a chain; the
whole chain has only the strength of the weakest link; if one link
breaks the chain is gone.
But in equity the material facts are of a different nature. One
cannot ordinarily raise a material and decisive issue by the denial of
any one. They are of varying degrees of importance, and the pleadings may show a strong or a weak case, which is not true at law.
The elements going to make up the cause in equity are not like links
in a chain, but like threads in a web; a thread may break but it may
not destroy the fabric.
The writer on the Code already quoted has pointed out these distinctions between pleadings at law and in equity as characteristic
under all -systems of procedure. Statutes have not and cannot
abolish them. He says: "In the legal action the issuable facts are
few; in the equitable action the material facts upon which the relief depends, or which influence and modify it, are generally numerous and often exceedingly so. In the former they are simple,
clearly defined, and certain; in the latter they may be, and frequently are, complicated, involved, contingent, and uncertain. A distinction inheres in the nature of the causes of action, and from this
distinction the facts material to the recovery in an equitable suit
may be numerous, complicated, affecting the right of recovery parAm.
' Seiver v. Un. Pac. R. R. Co., (68 Neb. 9), 93 N. W. 943, 61 L. R. A. 319, ho
St. Rep. 393.
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tially instead of wholly, modifying rather than defeating, the remedy if not established; but still they are the material facts constituting the cause of action, and not mere details of evidentiary or
probative matter."
It would seem clear, therefore, that no efforts on the part of the
reformer could make pleadings at law and in equity identical. In
so far as the causes of action are inherently different and founded
on different conceptions of the function of allegations, the rules for
their statement must also differ. A bill for a divorce on the ground
of cruelty is necessarily a very different thing from a declaration
for breach of a promise to marry.
If all the foregoing differences between equitable and legal proceedings are insurmountable, how far is is practicable, to use the
words of the Michigan Constitution, to abolish the unwelcome distinctions ?
One thing is practicable,and that is to abolish limitations on the
jurisdiction of courts, giving one tribunal power to adjudicate all
cases at law and in equity. This does not result in a confusion'of
court business. Where one court has the double jurisdiction it is
immediately divided up into law and equity divisions, or its business.is apportioned to law and equity calendars or dockets.
Thus, in England, the Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1873
consolidated all the superior courts of England, that is, to say, the
High Court of Chancery, the Queen's Bench, the Common Pleas,
the Exchequer, the High Court of Admiralty, the Court of Probate
and the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, into one Su-"
preme Court of Judicature, with all the powers bf the various courts
which were merged into it. This combined in one court all equitable and legal powers, and gave to that court full legal and equitable
jurisdiction.
The English Judicature Act then proceeded to separate the court
into divisions for the more convenient dispatch of business, and
these divisions followed in a general way the jurisdictional lines of
the old courts which had been consolidated. These were the Chancery Division, the Queen's Bench Division, the Common Pleas Division, the Exchequer Division, and the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division.
By the supplementary Act of 1875 it was provided that every
person who commenced an action should assign the cause to that
division of the court which he deemed proper by marking the name
of that division upon the summons by which the action was commenced. Almost all of tle so-called Code states have adopted this
Pomeroy's Code Remedies ( 4 th rod.) 558.
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reform of consolidating courts and jurisdiction, and so have other
states which are not to be so classedi On the other hand so progressive an act as the New Jersey Practice Act of 1912, confines
itself to proceedings in actions at law, and not only does not merge
the law and chancery courts but does not even attempt to change
the chancery practice.
There are important advantages in consolidation of courts, and
it is to be regretted that Michigan is not to enjoy a single court having jurisdiction of both law and chancery cases. Where such a
consolidation is made both legal and equitable questions and issues
may properly be raised in the same proceeding, and legal and equitable rights and defenses may be set forth in the same pleadings, and
legal and equitable relief may be administered through the same
judgment. It would save the absurdity of the judge as a chancellor
formally enjoining parties from prosecuting an action before him
as a law judge, for if he exercised both law and equity jurisdiction
an equitable counter-claim in the original action- would fully meet
the need.
But a still more serious result of the distinction between proceedings at law and in equity has been the disastrous effect of commencing an action in the wrong court. This is something which is
wholly unnecessary, and it suggests that
Another thing is entirely practicable, and that is to abolish the
consequences now resulting from commencing a law action in the
chancery court, or an equity action in the law court.
If the two courts were merely two divisions of the same court, or
if one court merely maintained separate law and equity dockets,
nothing would seem more natural than to transfer a case from one
division or one docket to the other when the administration of justice would be thereby facilitated.
Thus, in England, after having established the five divisions of
the Supreme Court of. Judicature, the Judicature Act provided that
any cause or matter might at any time, with or without application
from any of the parties thereto, be transferred from one division
to another.
When any party finds that he is in the wrong division of the
court he is authorized by Rule of Court to notify the other party
that he will at a certain time and place apply for an order transferring the cause to the proper division.
But this practice is in reality equally appropriate whether there
are two courts, or two divisions or two dockets of a single court.
7 For example,-Georgia, Code, 1895, § 4320; Pennsylvania, Purdons Dig. tquity;
Massachusetts, R. L., 1go2, Ch. 159.
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And this is the practice which has been adopted by the Michigan
Judicature Act. Chapter XI, Sec. 2, provides:
"If at any time it appears that a suit commenced in equity
should have been brought as an action, on the law side of the
court, or if it appear that an action commenced on the law side
of the court should have been brought in equity, it shall be
forthwith transferred to the proper side, and be there proceeded
with, with only such alteration in the pleadings as shall be
necessary."
A serious practical disadvantage iiicident to the divided jurisdiction which the Judicature Act retains, appears in connection with
the question, how the objection of want of equity should be raised.
In principle there should no longer be such an objection. A failure
to allege facts entitling the plaintiff to any relief would raise a question going to the merits of the bill, but the mere objection that the
plaintiff has not shown himself entitled to relief in a court of equity
would not necessarily mean any more than that he was on the
wrong side of the court. Want of equity ought therefore to be
deemed an ambiguous and improper objection. The defendant
should logically, either raise the substantial question whether the
plaintiff's pleading showed a right to any relief, or he should expressly raise the formal objection that the case is on the wrong side
of the court, and ask to have it transferred. But inasmuch as the
court on each side has only the limited jurisdiction appurtenant to
that side, it is without jurisdiction to determine the substantial
question whether the plaintiff is entitled to any relief. All the equity
court can do is to pass on the question whether the plaintiff states
facts entitling him to relief in equity; and conversely, the law court
has jurisdiction only on the question whether plaintiff has alleged
a good cause of action at law. It seems, therefore, that the substantial question, whether the pleading shows a right to any relief,
must, under the Judicature Act, be split up into two questions,
(i) does the bill (or declaration) show a good cause of action in
equity (or at law) and, if this question has been determined in the
negative and a transfer made to the other side of the court, the defendant is in a position to raise the next question, (2) does the bill
(or declaration) show a good cause of action on the side of the
court to which it has been transferred? Under the practice in those
Code states where the jurisdiction in law and equity has been consolidated, but where the two classes of proceedings, legal and equitable, are still retained, the objection is either that the plaintiff has
not alleged facts entitling him to any relief or that his case should
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8
be transferred to the other side of the court. This is good practice,
but seems unavailable under the Judicature Act.
The Judicature Act appears, on the whole, to be a very conservative statute in its bearing upon the distinctions between legal -and
equitable proceedings. So far as it goes it is unquestionably good,
and the only strange thing is that after waiting more than sixty
years to carry out a reform ordered by the Constitution, the reform
was not made more complete. The act does go somewhat farther
the distinctions in name between
than here indicated, by removing
9
between parties plaintiff in law
and
law and chancery summonses,
designations of attorneys and
the
between
and
and chancery cases,lb
clerks of court on the two sides of the court;11 and it unifies the
law and chancery practice in the matter of the persons who are au12
thorized to serve process, and enlarges the territorial scope of the
of the state-wide scope of the sumemulation
in
law
summons at
mons in chancery ;' and in various other details it removes useless
differences in the practice relating to law and chancery cases. It
may be hoped that the good effects of the Act will so favorably impress the bar and the public that the way may be paved for a subsequent consolidation of jurisdictions.
(To Be Continued.)
EDSON R. SUNDERMAND.
School.
Law
Michigan
of
University
Forrest, i5 B. Mon.
Chap. XIII, § 5.
10 Chap. XII, § x.
2Chap. 1, § 48; Chap. II, § 65.
Chap. XIII, § 22.
23 Chap. XIII, § 27.
STrustees v.

S68; Conyngham v. Smith, 16 Ia. 471.
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II.

FoRmS Or ACTION.

T

HE Judicature Act devotes a tiny-chapter of two sections to
Forms of Action,' although only the first section really deals
with that subject. In this section it is provided that four
ordinary common law actions, assumpsit, trespass on the case, replevin and ejectment, and three extraordinary actions, certiorari,
mandamus and quo warranto, are retained, but all other actions are
abolished. The action of assumpsit is declared to be proper in all
cases where assumpsit, debt or covenant were formerly used, and
trespass on the case is declared to be proper wherever case, trespass
or trover were formerly maintainable. Assumpsit thus becomes the
universal contractual remedy and case the universal tort remedy,
so far as damages are concerned. Penalties and forfeitures are to
be recovered by the action of assumpsit. But in respect to certain
torts-trespass to lands, fraud and deceit and the conversion of
personalty into money-the plaintiff shall have his election to sue
in case or assumpsit.
The situation affecting the ordinary actions is somewhat different
from that relating. to the extraordinary actions retained by the Act,
and a clearer view of the purpose and extent-of the reforms effected
may be had by a separate consideration of the two groups of actions.
(a)

THH. ORDINARY ACTIONS.

In passing sentence of death upon debt, covenant, trespass and
trover, the legislature was, in appearance at least, only pursuing a
course which has marked the history of the common law for many
centuries. Nothing has been more characteristic of the law of England than its forms of action. The modern lawyer knows the names
of but few of them, but hundreds are found among the records of
the medimval law courts.2 Rights were closely wedded to forms
in the early law, and forms of action were in truth the only means or
instruments by which our forefathers were able to dispense justice.
1Chap. XI.
2 "How many forms of action were there? A precise answer to this simple
would require a long prefatory discourse, for we should have to draw some line
mere variations upon the one hand and more vital differences on the other; *
might easily raise the tale of forms to some hundreds, but perhaps we shall
the right effect if we say that there were in common use some thirty or forty
2 Pollock & Maitland: Hist.
between which there were large differences."
Law, 564.

question
between
* * We
produce
actions,
of Eng.
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Gradually new forms arose and old forms passed away. Every age
retained or develop'ed those adapted to its wants and discarded such
as had lost their practical value. Thus the formed actions of the
common law have always been in a state of flux, reflecting the
needs of the day with only the conventional reverence for the past
which conservatism always produces.
"Our forms of action," write Pollock and Maitland, "are not
mere rubrics nor dead categories; they are not the outcome of a
classificatory process that has been applied to pre-existing material.
They are institutes of the law; they are-we say it without scrupleliving things. Each of them lives its own life, has its own adventures, enjoys a longer or shorter day of vigour, usefulness and popularity, and then sinks perhaps into a decrepit and friendless old age.
A few are still-born, some are sterile, others live to see their children and children's children in high places. The struggle for life
is keen among them and only the fittest survive."'
If we were looking for a strict counterpart or continuation of the
common law evolution of actions in the Judicature Act we should
expect to find that those actions which had proved to be ineffective
or had become outgrown would be the ones to go, and the vigorous
and usable actions would be the ones to survive. But in this case
no such situation is disclosed. The actions so summarily abolished
by the legislature were by no means obsolete and showed no inherent
tendency to gravitate toward the scrap-heap. They were all of
them familiar tools for litigation, and their names and the rules
which governed their use were commonplaces to every lawyer.
Why, then, should they have been marked for the slaughter?
As a matter of fact it can hardly be contended that one modern
action has any special advantage over another. Each has its own
place, with more or less overlapping upon others, and none could
be abolished without leaving a hole in the remedial structure. The
Judicature Act did not contemplate the withholding of any remedy.
What it really did was not to abolish four actions and retain two.
It abolished all the common law actions for the recovery of damages
and in their place it substituted two entirely new actions called "trespass on the case" and "assumpsit." It divided all causes of action
for damages into two classes, those based on contract and those
based on tort, and declared that the former should be called "case"
and the latter "assumpsit." In doing so it employed a common but
always misleading method-it used old terms, terms which had been
worked over and thought over for centuries, terms which were full of
2

H1ist. of Eng. Law. 561.
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historical significance and which had become interwoven into the very
fabric of the common law, and decreed that henceforth they should
mean something entirely different. Such arbitrary and forced
changes in the meanings of words are always confusing. We break
with the past but retain its language to sooth our feelings, and then,
under the spell of the old, familiar terms, we forget that the break
was ever made.
It is quite plain that we have not retained the action of assumpsit
nor the action of trespass on the case. We have not retained any
of the common law actions for the recovery of damages. All are
gone, partly by express abolition, partly by implied abolition. In
the place of six old actions we now have two new ones. If they bad
been called "tort action" and "contract action," no one would have
been confused or misled. They would have carried the visible badge
of novelty. But their character is not dependent upon their names.
They are just as new, just as different from any of the common law
actions, as though the old names had been abandoned also. This
is an outstanding feature of the Act which should not be lost sightof. Old rules and doctrines of assumpsit and case no longer apply;
the historical development of those actions no longer throws light
on their present scope and meaning; the continuity is gone; the
bottles are old but the wine in them is new. Procedure, as far as
it relates to damages, has taken a dual instead of a multiple form,-the substantive distinctions between tort and contract are now translated into the field of remedies in lieu of all other distinctions applicale to ordinary actions for damages.
The 'attempted retention of assumpsit and case was doubtless
a concession to the prejudices of a conservative profession. There
has always been a strong antipathy among the lawyers of this State
to Code Pleading, and nothing which too closely resembled that much
distrusted system could have passed the legislature. "Assumpsit"
and "trespass on the case" sounded entirely orthodox and respectable,
and exorcised the bogy of a "Code" defection. But the Code, while
undoubtedly subject to many.just criticisms, is entirely sound and
logical on the point here involved, namely, the forms of personal
actions. It openly and frankly abolished them all and substituted a
single action in their place. The Judicature Act covertly, but no less
effectively, has abolished them all and substituted two actions in
their place. This is illogical and unnecessary. One action will
equally serve the purposes of two and it is therefore much better.
If the old actions are to go why not provide an entirely modern
substitute? Why stop short in the process of simplification?
The origin of forms of action must be sought in history, not in
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logic. They were incidental to the old English system of original
writs. After the Norman conquest the source of judicial power
was deemed to be the King. The courts were his courts, and the
judges his judges. They had only the jurisdiction which he gave
them, and the royal method of conferring jurisdiction was through
the royal writ. A suitor in the king's court had to obtain the king's
order to his judges to take jurisdiction of the case, as well as to get
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, and the original writ
performed both functibns. It was at once a notice to the defendant
to come into court and an authorization to the court to take jurisdiction of the controversy. Now if the writ was the court's warrant
for taking up the case, it was clear that the writ must specify the
nature of the action, for the king gave no carte blanche to his judges.
There were as many different kinds of writs as there were different
kinds of controversies. Every writ was good for all the cases which
could be construed to fall within its terms, but for no others. New
forms of writ were devised to meet new needs, and when once a
form of writ was prepared, copies of it were issued to all who
thought they could use it. The writs gave form to the actions, and
all actions which could be prosecuted under -the same writ were
therefore of the same form. There were as many forms of action
as there were forms of writs.
But under out theory. of government the courts no longer need a
special warrant for trying cases, for the judicial power to adjudicate
all controversies is given to them originally and directly from the
people. Therefore forms of writs cease to have any utility. Original
writs in the old sense therefore necessarily disappear and judicial
writs take their place as notices to defendants that they must appear
before the court. The nature of the case need not be specified in
the notice or summons, for the defendant may obtain full information from the pleadings. Hence a single form of summons is sufficient, and the only compelling reason for the different forms of
action has disappeared.
Logically the whole question is one of convenience in judicial
administration. If many forms of action are better adapted for
general use they should be employed; but if fewer forms result in a
simpler and more effective procedure, then fewer should be used.
So far 5s personal actions for damages are concerned, there does not
seem to be the slightest occasion for more than one form-a simple
civil action. The single action has been used in England and in the
Code States of this country with complete success. All the strictly
personal actions heretofore in use in Michigan-assumpsit, debt,
covenant, trespass, case and trover-are adapted to identical pro-
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cedural treatment. The same form of summons is adapted to all
of them, the same kind of statement of facts will constitute a cause
of action in each, the same kinds of pleadings will raise the same
kinds of issues in each, and the incidents of the trial, judgment and
execution are the same in all of them. So far as these actions are
concerned the Judicature Act stopped just short of the logical and
practical goal.
When we turn to the actions for the recovery of specific property
the case is somewhat different. Replevin and ejectment involve procedural incidents which are not found in the actions sounding solely
in damages, and these features tend to separate and differentiate
them from actions of the latter kind. In the Code States the effort
was made to reduce all actions to a single form, and general pro-,
visions in the Codes of Civil Procedure declared that all forms were
abolished and that thereafter there should be but one form for the
enforcement of all rights and the redress of all wrongs, to be known
as a civil action. But even in the original New York Code it was
seen that special provisions were needed to cover the case of replevin,
and a separate chapter of nine sections was drawn up for this purpose. 4 But lest the new practice should be contaminated by any of
the old doctrines of the common law this new Code scrupulously
avoided the word replevin and all its derivatives, substituting the
name "Claim and Delivery." But the characteristics of the action
under the new name were so strikingly similar to those which distinguished the old action that gradually the old terms came back, and
the present New York Code has an elaborate article of forty-seven
sections which in Chase's Code is frankly called "Action of Replevin" and which uses the term replevin, replevy or replevied many
times.5 Actions to recover possession of personal property are in
.all jurisdictions necessarily in a class by themselves, and there is
no advantage in attempting to carry out a forced uniformity by suppressing a distinguishing nomenclature. "The rules of pleading in
replevin cases are specially provided by statute and constitute an
exception to the ordinary rules governing other cases," says the
Court in a typical western Code State. If, then, in spite of well
directed efforts to reduce all actions to uniformity the Codes have
been forced to recognize the claim of replevin to independent existence, the Judicature Act only showed an appreciation of fundamental
principles and of the results of experience in retaining this action.
4 Laws of New York, 1848, Ch. 379, Tit. 7, Ch. 2.

5 Chase's Pocket Code of Civ. Proc., Ch. 14, Tit. 2, Art. x.
0 Woodbridge v. DeWitt, (1897), 51 Nebr. 98.
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Ejectment is not so clear a case of separate identity, since it lacks
the provisional suinmary features of replevin. The original New
York Code seems to have contemplated the feasibility of merging
this action with the rest, but experience showed that a different
treatment was required in various respects, so that a 'body of statutory provisions relating to the practice in "Actions to Recover Real
Property" grew up, making an Article consisting eventually of thirtyfive sections. 7 However, in most of the Code States and in England
it has been found practicable to employ the ordinary rules or practice almost exclusively in actions for the recovery of possession of
real property, so that the retention of ejectment is less fully justified
than the retention of replevin.
(b)

THE EXTRAORDINARY ACTIONS.

Certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto have been retained.
It is possible to dispense with the writ of certiorari, and it has
been done in a few jurisdictions. Thus in Ohio both writs of error
and writs of certiorari are abolished by statute, and the courts are
given power to order transcripts of proceedings to be furnished as
formerly they could do by such writs.8 And the same thing has
been done in Kansas' and Nebraska."0 In a number of states the
writ has been called a writ of review.11 But in the great majority
of our states, as well as under the very enlightened English practice,
the writ of certiorari is still the standard method of obtaining a review of the acts of inferior courts and officers or boards exercising
quasi judicial functions. It is hard to see what real advantage is
to be gained by merely changing its name, and while it would be possible to make the practice in certiorari cases formally identical with
that in the ordinary actions, by substituting a declaration in place of
the affidavit now used, and a summons or rule to plead in place of
the writ, and a plea in place of the return, such changes would not
seem to be entirely free from criticism. The affidavit does not contain a substantially full statement of the facts on which the action
of the court is to be founded, but these facts really "appear in the
return. Again, the return, unlike a plea, is an official statement
which is to be taken as true, so that only questions of law can be
raised in regard to those facts. The question raised by the action
of certiorari is one respecting the legal correctness of judicial or quasi
7 Chase's Pocket Code of Civ. Proc., Ch. 14, Tit. i, Art. i.
s Ohio Gen. Code, § 12282.
')Gen. St., igoi, § 5050.
15
Comp. St., gir, § 7175.
11 California, Kerr's Code Civ. Pro., § io67; Montana, Rev. Codes, i9o7, § 7202;
Oregon, Lord's Laws, § 602; Utah, Comp. L., 1.o7, § 3629.
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judicial acts, rather than of the existence and infringement of private
rights. In every ordinary personal action there must be set up a
"cause of action," which is defined to be a statement of facts showing a' primary right in the plaintiff and a violation of that right by
the defendant. But in certiorari no such cause of action is involved. Hence to attempt to abolish certiorari as a distinct remedy
and to enforce parties to employ the forms applicable to ordinary
actions at law, would be a surrender of substance to form, and a
worship of uniformity at the expense of logical discrimination.
Mandamus is much more susceptible to uniform treatment than
fcertiorari. Here we are always concerned with the existence of a
cause of action in the ordinary sense, for the question involved is
not the propriety of past official conduct but the right of the applicant to force the doing of an official act for his own benefit or advantage. The petition in mandamus, as used in this State, is required
to state the facts on which the party relies, exactly as does a declaration, and the affidavit (or return to the alternative writ) is an answer to those facts consisting of denials or facts in confession and
avoidance, which in theory is quite comparable to a plea, though
practically more like an answer in chancery. To the answer the
person prosecuting the action may, for the purpose of framing an
The
issue, be allowed to plead exactly as in case of a replication.
is
the
petition
after
issues
cause
show
to
order
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writ
fact that the
filed, instead of in advance of it as in case of a summons preceding a
declaration, is not at all an important difference. In fact our practice
of commencing ordinary actions by declaration and rule to plead is
a very similar proceeding, and the rule to plead in a mandamus case
would merely become a special order rather than a common order
as now employed in ordinary actions. In a number of states actions
of mandamus are commenced by filing the same pleading as in other
actions.' 3
But even if these changes in the practice were made, we should
still have to retain mandamus as a separate category of procedure,
because we have not adopted a single civil action but still retain two
actions, assumpsit and case, in neither one of which would mandamus
properly be included. So that although the action could have been
made much more like the ordinary actions without any great difficulty, which would doubtless have been a real advantage in unifying
and standardizing judicial proceedings, we should not have thereby
avoided doing what the Judicature Act did in retaining the separate
action of mandamus.
Vagner v. Gladwin Circuit judge, 131 Mfich. 129.
13See, for'example, the Ohio Statute, Gen. Code, § § 12283-12302.
1
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In quo warranto, again, we have a situation very similar to an
ordinary action, where the attorney general or relator sets up in
substantially the style of a common declaration the facts which constitute a cause of action against the defendant. The information,
accordingly, although itS allegations are very general, is a close
counterpart of a declaration, the summons employed is precisely the
same sort of writ as that used in ordinary actions, and the plea to
the information is of course the same sort of pleading in form as a
plea to a declaration, though in substance it aims rather to show a
title than a defense. The replication authorized to be filed to the
plea is clearly an ordinary pleading. The discretionary feature, when
it applies, is no different from that in mandamus and would merely
result in requiring an order for the issuance of the summons or the
substitution of a special rule to plead.
That thi assimilation of this action to an ordinary action is feasible
has been amply shown by the experience of many jurisductions.
Thus, in Ohio' 4 , California 5, Iowa' 6, and Kansas 7 , the ordinary
forms of pleadings and proceedings are employed, with only such
incidental special provisions as necessarily result from the peculiar
nature of the rights and liabilities involved and the means necessary
to enforce them. In place of the peculiar practice of a suggestion of
damages, a regular action may be brought by the person whose right
has been adjudicated.' 8
But as pointed out above in connection with the action of mandamus, our two ordinary actions of assumpsit and case do not adapt
themselves very well to the incorporation of this action, and so long
as we keep that dual system of ordinary actions this extraordinary
action should probably be retained. And it mtist 'be tonceded that
in many states which have abolished all the ordinary forms, and now
use only the "civil action" so called for all ordinary purposes, quo
warranto is still prosecuted by means of an information, so that in
spite of our failure to provide for a single ordinary action we are
at least abreast of these states in respect to quo warranto.
(To be Continued.)
RDSON R. SUND RLANTD.
The Law School, Michigan University.
14 Gen. Code, § § I2303-12344.
15 People

v. Sutter St. Ry. Co. (I9oo),

x29 Cal. 545, 547.

"16
Code, 1897, § § 4313-4335.
- V Gen. Stat., i9o9, § § 6275, et seq.
"8Kansas, Gen. St., 1909, § 628i; Iowa, Code, 1897, § 4323.
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THE MICHIGAN JUDICATURE ACT OF 1915.

III. PARTIES To ACTIONS.
r wduld not be worth while to discuss all the provisions which
the Judicature Act has made on the subject of parties to actions,
but certain features of this legislation which are deemed'particularly novel and important will be briefly treated under the following
heads:
I.

ACTIONS TO BE BROUGHT IN THE NAME Or THI
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.

The Judicature Act provides that "Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, but an executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee of an express trust, a party with
-whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit
of another, or a party expressly authorized by statute, may sue in
his own name without joining with him the party for whose benefit
the action is brought."
This provision was taken almost literally from the New York Code
of Civil Procedure and is found in substantially identical form in
practically all the so-called "codes."' it has been subjected to sixtyfive years of litigation for the purpose of construing its meaning,
so that at the present time this statute is pretty well understood.
Since the provision has been adopted from the "code" it must follow
that its interpretation by the "code" courts has also been adopted,
and it will therefore be comparatively easy to summarize its effect.
In the first place, while the different -codes vary in the verb
employed, some using "must" and some "shall," these words seem to
be treated -as equivalents, and the rule is that the statute is mandatory. 2
' It adopts the literal phraseology of the Iowa Statute, except that it substitutes
"shall" for "must" Iowa Code, 1897, § 3459.
70; Phoenix Ins.
IIis.
2 Eaton v. Alger, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 179; Chase v. Dodge, Iii
Co. v. Carnahan, 63 Ohio St. 258.
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The term "real party in interest" suggests on its face that it has
reference only -to the person who would gain or lose as the result of
the controversy, or, in other words, to the holder of the beneficial
interest. In which case an assignee of a chose in action for collection,
who is bound to turn over the avails of the suit to his assignor, would
not be the real party in interest and could not sue.3 Under this view
the Michigan case of Moore v. Hall,4 which sustained the right of an
agent to whom negotiable paper had been indorsed for collection, to
sue thereon in his own name, would no longer be good law.
But the great majority of code states have taken a more practical
view of the statute, and have found its meaning in the purpose which
it was obviously intended to serve, namely, to introduce the equity
rule that the action was to be brought by any party who was in a
position to get a jhldgment which would bar further litigation.
Thus, in Sturgis v. Baker,5 the Supreme Court of Oregon said:
"The statute requiring that every action shall be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest was enacted for the benefit of a
party defendant, to protect him from being harassed for the same
cause. But if not cut off from any just offset or counter-claim
against-the demand, and a judgment in behalf of the party suing
will fully protect him when discharged, then is his concern at an end.
This is the test as to whether such a defense is properly interprosed."
And in Geiselnman v. Starr,' the Supreme Court of California said:
"Where the plaintiff shows such a title as that a judgment upon it
satisfied by defendant will protect him from future annoyance or
loss, and where, as against the party suing, defendant can urge any
defenses he could make against.the real owner, then there is an end
of the defendant's concern and with it of his right to object; for, so
far as he is interested, the action is being prosecuted in the name
of the real party in interest." This test has been approved by many
courts and is supported by the great weight of authority under the
7
code.

The beneficial interest in the result of the action is such an interest
as satisfies the equity rule, for one who holds such an interest is
clearly in a position to get a judgment which will end the litigation
3 See Stewart v. Price, 64 Kan. 191, where the majority of the court strongly argue
the correctness of this view.
This case was expressly overruled two years later by
Manley v. Park, 68 Kan. 400.
4 48 Mich. 143.
43 Ore. 236.

o io6 Calif. 651.
7 Greene v. McAuley, 70 Kan. 6os; Chouteau v. Boughton, zoo Mo. 4o6; Hays v.
Hathorn, 74 N. Y. 486; Seybold v. Grand Forks Nat. Bank, 5 N. D. 46o; Chase v. Dodge,
"I Wis. 70; Elinquist v. Markoe, 45 Minn. 305.
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so far as the defendant is concerned. Hence such an interest will
constitute one the real party in interest under the new Judicature
Act."
But a naked legal title is also one upon which a valid judgmentcan be founded, and such a title is enough to constitute the holderthe real party in interest, although he has no beneficial interest whatever. Thus it has been held that the plaintiff was the real party in
interest when he sued as assignee for collection only of a claim for
wages,' when he sued as assignee of a claim for breach of contract
of employment, when the assignment was merely colorable as between the parties,10 where he sued as assignee of an assignable tort
claim, the transaction being without consideration and merely forthe purpose of preventing a removal to the federal courts,"1 and
where he sued as assignee for a foreign corporation which was not
entitled to sue, there being no consideration for the assignment and
the corporation being by agreement entitled to whatever should
be recovered.12 As said by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals in Kent v. Dana,3 "Where, as in Ohio, the code of procedurerequires that the suit shall be brought by the real party in interest,
it is nevertheless held that, when the plaintiff is the lawful hoIderof the note, it is no defense to the maker to show that the transfer
under which the plaintiff holds it is without consideration, or subject
to equities between him and his assignor, or colorably [sic], or merely for the purpose of collection, and that it is sufficient if he havethe legal title, either by written transfer or delivery, whatever mayle the equities of his relation with his assignor." One who holds the
legal title is entitled to sue as real party in interest even against thewill of the owner of the entire beneficial interest."It will follow from these authorities that any party who has heretofore been entitled to sue in his own name in Michigan must bethe real party in interest under the new Act, for clearly a judgment
obtained by any such plaintiff would be a complete protection to the
defendant from further litigation on the same cause of action. Therefore it may safely be said that so far as this provision goes it doesnot prevent anyone from suing who could have sued under the for-mer practice.
Swift & Co. v. Wabash R. R. Co., x49 Mo. App. 526.
9 Falconio v. Larsen, 31 Ore. 137.
10Friedman v. Schulman, 46 Misc. (N. Y.) 572.
nVimont v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 64 Ia. 513.
" Citizens' Bank v. Corkings, 9 S. D. 614.
0

1zoo Fed. 56; 40 C. C. A. 281.
14 Greene v. McAuley, 7o Kan. 6oi.
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Accordingly, if the new statute as to -the real party in interest is to
-introduce any change in the practice it must be in the direction of
enlarging the class of persons who are authorized to sue in their
-own names.
It must be admitted that the prior- practice as to parties plaintiff
-in this state was in some respects very liberal. By statute we had
.authorized actions by assignees in their own names,"5 which covered
-a substantial portion of the field intended to be covered by the code
through its "real party in interest" rule." And the decisions of the
Supreme Court of this state have in several instances shown a sur-prising indifference to forms and technicalities. One of the most
7
-remarkable of these decisions is Watson v. Watson, where a woman
-of full age brought an action in her own name against defendant
for her own seduction, and -the objection was made that the statute
-did not authorize an action in her name. It was conceded that the
statute did not expressly authorize such an action, but on the con-trary it expressly provided that she might authorize her father or
-any other relative to bring the action in her behalf and for her use
-and benefit. The court held that in spite of the want of authority in the
statute and in spite of the provision as to an action in her behalf by
her father or other relative, she might nevertheless prosecute the ac-tion in her own name. And in justification of this holding the court
.said -"The policy of legislation in this state has been to permit the
real party to bring an action in his or her own name and testify in
-his or her own behalf. It is no longer necessary for assignees to sue
in the name of the assignor or to bring an action in the name of
-one person for the use and benefit of another, even in cases of tort
where the action is assignable."
-This was a very advanced position for the court to take, and doubtless was a case of judicial legislation, but it was in t1e interest of
directness and simplicity in procedure. It indicated a policy in har-mony with the object now sought to be accomplished by the legisla-ture through the rile under discussion. And the court has very re-cently given expression to views almost literally identical with some
.-of those quoted above from the decisions in, code states. In Union
Ice Co. v. Detroit & Mackinac Ry. Co.,' the insured sued a tort. feasor for causing the loss of its building by fire, and it was claimed
that subrogation agreements with various insurance companies were
-relevant evidence, but the court held otherwise, saying: "The de"How. St. (2nd Ed.) § 12704.
11Pomeroy's Code Remedies (4th Ed.) § 63.
I'49 Alich. 540.
178 Mich. 346.
(914)
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fendant is interested only in knowing that a judgment, in the suit
brought, will relieve it from all liability for the consequences of its.
tort," thereby suggesting the equity rule as to who might properly
prosecute an action.
But there has not been an entirely consistent policy in this regard.
on the part of the court. Thus, in Richelieu & Ontario Navigation
Co. v. Thames & Mersey Ins. Co.,10 the plaintiff chartered a steamship to the Owen Sound Steamship Co., under an agreement that thecharterer should keep the vessel insured. A policy of insurancewas taken out by the charterer in the defendant company, and the
premium was paid by the charterer. The policy contained an agreement that the loss should be paid to the plaintiff. The court said:
"It was understood by the defendant that the insurance was in fact
made for plaintiff's benefit, and it was really so made. A payment
to plaintiff would absolve defendant from any duty to the Owen
Sound Steamship Company, if any such duty existed. Under such
circumstances we think the defendant entered into contract relationswhich plaintiff has a right to assert directly."
This is a direct holding that where two persons make a contract
for the sole benefit of a third person, such third person may suethereon in his own name, though he is a stranger to the consideration and not a party to the promise.
But where a husband bought an interest in a farm under an agreement with the grantor that he would live on the farm and work it,.
but if he died before his interest was paid for the grantor should refund to the grantee's wife the payments already made, it was held
that the wife could not sue.20 The court said: "She was not a party to
the contract and had paid none of the consideration * * * This"
case comes within the general rule that a promise made by one person to another for the benefit of a third person, a stranger to theconsideration, will not support an action by the latter." 21 And in
Linnernan v. Moross' Estate2 2- it was held that where property was
conveyed by a father to his son in consideration of the son's promise
to pay the grantor's daughter $io.oo a week, no action at law could
be maintained on this promise by the daughter.
Now it is quite clear that all three of these cases are identical inprinciple, for in each a sole beneficiary sought to enforce a contract
made between others. If the first case-was right the second and thircl
115MMich.

132.

2 Wheeler v. Stewart, 94 Mich. 445.
1 Citing Pipp v. Reynolds, 2o Mich. 88; Hidden v. Chappel, 48 Mich. 527; Edwards
Y. Clement, 81 Mich. 513; Hunt v. Strew, 39 Mich. 368.

" 98 Mich. 178.
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-were wrong. If want of priority is the only objection to a sole beneficiary suing in his own name, will these cases which deny the right
to sue be affected by the new provision as to the real party in interest?
Another common situation is where a debtor contracts with an,other to pay his debt, as when a grantee of land subject to a mortgage promises his grantor to pay the mortgage debt. Can the mortgagee sue the grantee on this contract? Our court has held that
creditors cannot recover upon an agreement made by a third person with the debtor to pay their claims, to which they are not parties,
and which has not been assigned to them.2 3 Will the new Act change
this ?
The provision as to the real party in interest was doubtless intended to authorize actions to be brought directly by the very person who
is substantially and beneficially interested in the result, and if the
sole beneficiary of a contract has any real interest in its performance
he ought to be able to sue upon it. It may be that the real question
here is rather one of right than of remedy. But it is certainly true
that many courts have held that the code provision as to the real
party in interest does authorize on action by the sole beneficiary of a
contract made by and between others. Thus in Pad.cahLunmber Co.
v. Paducah Water Sitpply, 4 the Supreme Court of Kentucky said:
"This court has held the doctrine well settled, a party for whose
benefit a contract is evidently made may sue thereon in his own name,
though the engagement be not directly to or with him (Smith v.
Lewis, 3 B. Mon., 229; Allen v. Thomas, 3 Met. 198), which practice
is not only in accordance with the rule found in Chitty on Pleading,
but seems to be required by section 18, Civil Code, that in express
terms provides every action must be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest, except that under section 21 a fiduciary or
trustee may bring an action without joining with him the person for
whose benefit it is prosecuted." And the Supreme Court of Missouri, in Ellis v. Harrison," held that a person for whose benefit
an express promise is made, in a valid contract between others, may
maintain an action upon it in his own name, and justified the ruling
as follows: "By our code of procedure, it is provided that every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest,
with certain exceptions; one of which is that the trustee of an ex'press trust may sue in his own name. The statute then declares that
such a trustee 'shall be construed to include a person with whom, or
'^

Edwards v. Clement, 81 Mich. 513.

2 89 Ky. 340, 347.
104

M0. 270, 277.
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in whose name, a contract is made for the benefit of another.' R. S.
,889, secs. I99o, I99i. Reading these sections together, it would
seem to be clearly implied that the beneficiary in such a contract
is to -beregarded as the real party in interest, and that, as such, he
may sue thereon in his own name; while on the other hand, the
contracting party (as trustee of an express trust, within the statutory
definition) may likewise maintain an action on the same contract."
That the real objection to such actions heretofore recognized in
this state is the technical one of want of privity to support the title
of the plaintiff in an action at law and not the substantial want of a
right in the plaintiff, is indicated by what our court said in Palmer
v. Bray,20 :- "It has been repeatedly held by this court that in a suit
in equity a person for whose benefit a promise is made may enforce
it in his own name." This would imply that now, when a legal title
is no longer necessary to support an action at law, a legal action may
properly be brought by the beneficiary of a contract made by and
between others.
This doctrine should doubtless include a contract made by a debtor
to pay the debt to a third person, as where a grantee of land subject
to a mortgage promises his grantor to assume the mortgage debt. It cannot be objected that there is no right in
the mortgagee, for our statute expressly creates it.YT "Such an agreement, though made with the grantor of the property, inures to the
benefit of one having a mortgage upon it.""8 That being so it would
follow that the mortgagee would be the real party in interest and
the proper plaintiff in an action at law. This is clearly stated by
the Supreme Court of Colorado in Starbird v. Cranston,29 where
the court says :-" 'According to this generally accepted view, the
liability of the grantee, who thus assumes the payment of an outstanding mortgage, does not depend upon any extension of the
equitable doctrine concerning subrogation; it is strictly legal, arising
out of a contract binding at law; the mortgagee, instead of enforcing
the liability by a suit in equity for a foreclosure, may maintain an
action at law against the grantee upon his promise, and recover a
personal judgment for the whole mortgage debt.' * * * Under our
code the action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest; and certainly the beneficiary, or person for whose benefit
the promise is made, is the real party in interest, whether the promise is evidenced by a simple contract or one under seal."
'36 Mich. 87.
How. St. (2nd Ed.)
21I ollen v. SOOy, 172

§ 12037.
Mich. 214,

219.
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NON-JOINDIR AND MIS-J

INDIER O

t

PARTIES.

"No action at law or in equity shall be defeated by the non-joinder
or mis-joinder of parties. New parties may be added and parties misj6ined may be dropped, by order of the0 court, at any stage of the
case, as the ends of justice may require."" This provision was taken
from the New Jersey practice act of x912. ' Up to the present time
no decisions have been published in New Jersey construing this provision, but inasmuch as New Jersey took the provision in substance
from Order 16, rule II, of the English Supreme Court Rules, the
decisions in England as to the meaning and scope of those portions
of the rule which correspond to the New Jersey and Michigan statutes would be authoritative adjudications.
any change in
The Judicature Act cannot be taken as intending
2
CAIRNS in
Lord
Hamilton,"
v.
Kendall
in
.Thus
liabilities.
or
rights
the
"Although
delivering the opinion of the House of Lords, said:
nonthe
to
abatement,
in
plea
form of objecting, by means of a
joinder of a defendant who ought to be included in the action, is
abolished, yet I conceive that the application to have the person so
omitted included as a defendant ought to be granted or refused, onthe same principles on which a plea in abatement would have succeeded or failed."
33
So in Wilson & Sons v. Steamship Co., the Court of Appeal, per
Lord EsimR, said that "it was not intended by the Judicature Act
to alter people's substantive rights. A larger power was given to the
'court by the new procedure as to joinder of parties; but that procedur6 ought, as it seems to me, to be administered vith regard to
the principles of the old law orr the subject."
Accordingly, wherever a plea in abatement or a demurrer would,
have beenproper underthe old law on the ground of defect of parties
defendant, a motion by defendants to. dismiss unless the additional
parties be brought in will be proper, or the plaintiff might of course
make a motion for leave to amend by adding other defefdants. And:
the same reasoning would apply to non-joinder of plaintiffs. In caseof new plaintiffs being brought in pursuant to an order of the court,
there would seem to be no insuperable objection to employing the
equity rule in all cases and making a necessary party plaintiff a defendant if he refused to join voluntarily as a plaintiff. The broad

1124

Cofo. 20.

'Judicature Act, Chap. XII, Sec. x3.
' Sec. 9.
[18791 4 App. Cas. 504, 516.

3IP8933 x Q. 3. 422, 427.
4 [1898] 2i Q. B. 380.
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power conferred on the court to order in new parties in both law
and equity actions would doubtless suffice to warrant such a proceeding. In Cullen v. Knowles, 34 the Queen's Bench Division ordered
a joint promisee who refused to join as plaintiff, to be brought in
as a defendant, and declared that the judgment could easily be adjusted to meet such a separation of plaintiffs. The New Jersey
Practice Act, which concerns itself only with law actions, expressly
authorizes one who should join as plaintiff to be made a defendant
in the first instance if he refuses to join.35 If compulsory joinder of
missing plaintiffs were to be deemed proper under the Judicature
Act, some form of process would be necessary in addition to the
amendment of the declaration, just as in the case of the compulsory
bringing in of ordinary defendants. In either case an amendment
of the summons or rule to plead and service of the same would
be necessary, 6 or the practice prescribed by old Circuit Court rule
No. 6, now repealed, might be followed, a new writ being issued in
the nature of a summons directed to the new parties sought to be
added as defendants. So far as bringing in new parties goes, the
new Act seems to add little to the old practice respecting new parties
defendant, except to make the method more direct, but in respect to
bringing in new pirties plaintiff the new Act marks a substantial
advance, for our court had always refused to permit amendments
37
adding new plaintiffs.

As for getting rid of superfluous parties, plaintiffs have long had
the privilege of voluntarily dismissing as to any of the defendants
upon payment of costs as to them, and thereupon amending their
declarations accordingly.3" But the same privilege has not been accorded in respect to dropping superfluous plaintiffs. It would seem
as though so utterly technical and easily obviated a defect as misjoinder of plaintiffs would have been deemed amendable under our
liberal statute of amendments which authorized the court "to amend
any process, pleading, or proceeding * * * either in form or substance,

*

for the furtherance of justice,

*

'"

at any time be-

fore judgment rendered therein, ' 3 but the construction given to
this statute has not permitted such amendment, but on the contrary
our Supreme Court has held that "it is well settled that a misjoinder
of plaintiffs is fatal." 40 So that the new Act will effectually destroy
this useless and senseless rule of the common law.
2 Practice Act, 1912, § 5.
*3Follower v. Laughlin, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 1o5.
37Wood v. Insurance Co., 96 Mich. 437.
=s Old Circuit Court Rule 27, b.
1 How. St. (2nd Ed.) § 12969.
40 Rogcrs v. Raynor, 102 Mich. 473.
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3. JOINDER OF PARTIES SEVERALLY LIABLE.
Under an old statute it has long been competent in this state to
join as defendants any or all parties severally liable upon the same
negotiable instrument,41 and judgment might be rendered for or
against any of the parties so joined.4" This is a very common form
of statute, found substantially in the great majority of the states
which have adopted the code.43 But the Judicature Act has superseded it, and in its place has provided that "It shall be lawful for any
plaintiff to include in one action as defendants, all or any of the
parties who may be severally or jointly and severally liable, and to
proceed to judgment and execution according to the liability of the
parties." 44 This is substantially the language employed in the English practice, except that our Act does not permit the joinder of
parties alleged to be liable in the alternative."
It broadens the former practice in several respects. In the first
place the joinder is no longer confined to persons liable on bills of
exchange or promissory notes. Nor is it even necessary that they
be liable on the same instrument, whatever its character may be,
as is so common in American statutes.46 Several and joint and
several promisors on any sort of an obligation, written or oral, come
within the terms of the statute.
In terms the statute goes even farther than this. It does'not confine
the cases to which it applies to those arising on contract, but is broad
enough to include all kinds of several or joint and several liabilities,
one variety of which would be several liabilities of tort-feasors. The
question arises, therefore, whether several tort-feasors can be joined
under this statute and a judgment be recovered against such of them
as are proved to be liable. But it would seem quite clear that unless
radical changes are made in the rules as to joinder of causes of
action, the several liabilities of several wrongdoers cannot be determined in a single action, because if the liability is several and not
joint it must be a case where there is no community or co-operation
in the wrongdoing, in which case there would be as many distinct
and separate torts as there are parties who are severally under liability. When a number- of parties, each acting separately, pollute a
stream, they are severally and not jointly liable for the wrongful
" How.

St. (2nd Ed.) § 12705.
' How. St. (2nd Ed. § 127o7.
.'See 15 Encyc. P1. & Pr. 741.
44Chap. 12, Sec. 15.
3Order XVI, rule 4.
40 x5 Encyc. P1. & Pr. 741.
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But to join them all in a single action would be not only a
5oinder of parties severally liable but a joinder of different causes
of action, each one against a different defendant. Such a result
could not have been contemplated by the statute now under discussion, for it purports to refer to the joinder of parties only. Even if
a joint cause of action in tort is alleged against a number of defendants-and such a tort would of course in its nature be joint and
several-if the proof should fail to establish the joint character of
the tort there would at most appear to have been a number of
separate torts committed by the several parties defendant, and if
judgments were to be rendered against each in such a case, they
would be separate judgments on distinct and different causes of action and not judgments establishing several liabilities on the same
cause of action. Whether as a question of joinder of causes of action
such a proceeding might be convenient and desirable is another
-matter, and its propriety would involve the sections of the judicature Act covering joinder of actions.
:cts.

4.

INTERVENTION.

Intervention is a proceeding native to the civil law and familiar
to the ecclesiastical and admiralty law, but not known in the early
-equity practice nor found among common law remedies. POTHIR
defines it as "an act by which third person demanids to be received
as a party in a case formed between other parties, either to join
with the plaintiff and demand the same thing he does or something
connected with 'it, or to join with the defendant and oppose with
him the demand of the plaintiff which he is interested in defeating. '48 CHITTY says that "in some courts a third person, not origin.ally a party to the suit or proceeding, but claiming an interest in the
subject matter, may, in order the better to protect such interest, interpose his claim, which is a proceeding termed in the Ecclesiastical
-Courts intervention. * * * Intervention is unknown in our Courts
of Law and Equity, but is admitted in the practice of the
Ecclesiastical Courts.""8 In modern equity practice, however, it has
0
become common. Thus, in Marsh v. Green,5
the Supreme Court
,of Illinois said that "any person feeling that he has an interest in the
I' Cooley on Torts (3rd Ed.) 25o.
Is Oeuvreb Compltes, Trait6 de la Procedure Civile, pt. x, ch. 2, sec. 7, § 3.
The term does not appear in the Corpus Legum of Haenel, which would indicate
that the proceeding was developed subsequent to Justinian's time.
2 General Practice (ist Am. Ed.) 492.
See The Oregon, 45 Fed. 62, 76, for its
uise in admiralty.
79 Ill.
385.
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litigation may apply to the court, and be permitted to intervene and
become a party, and have his rights passed upon on the hearing."
But in common law actions, where no statute creates such a right,
no intervention has ever been permitted.51
The Judicature Act has given us a very broad statute on intervenefei,
that "In an action ein
tion, wh
r
anyone claimning an interest in-the litigation ma, at any time, be
right by intervention, but thein&vention
ei-itte o asselt
sfilYlb in subordiatin to, and ii recognitin of, the propriety of
the main proceeding." 2
This provision is fully as broad as the statutes of Louisiana, 5
Iowa, 54- California, " and a half dozen other states which have followed their lead, pn should receive the same-liberal intrpretation
which the courts of those states have almost universally given. In a
leading case in, Iowa,' arising uider a-statute substantiallytlisame
as ours, the plaintiff sued on two promissory notes in which he was
named as payee. A third party filed a petition in intervention alleging that he was the real and beneficial owner of the notes, and that
the plaintiff had no interest in them except the legal title. At common law two actions would have been necessary, for the plaintiff as
the holder of the legal title would have been clearly entitled -to recover, and the third party would then have had to sue him for money
had and received. But the court, speaking through a very eminent
lawyer and judge, John F. DILI oN, held that the design of the statute
was to prevent a multiplicity of actions, and since the third party
was, beneficially entitled to the avails of the suit it was proper for.
him to intervene and obtain a judgment for that which he was ultimately entitled to get.
The statute does not specify vhat interest or how great an interest
is necessary to permit an intervention. Any interest is sufflcien , and
the fact that the intervenor may or may Wot be able to protect hisinftrest in some other way is not material. Accordingly, where an ac96n was brought by an alleged owner of a tract of land condemned
for public use to recover the award, third persons who claimed an
interest in the land were permitted to intervene. The court said:
"If the whole of the award should be paid over to the plaintiff, and
-

51See Rocca v. Thompson,

23 U. S. 3 17, for an interesting discussion ok intervention.

62 Chapter XII, See. ii.
"Garland's Rev. Code of Prac. §§ 389-394.
" Code, 1897, §§ 3594-3596.

"Code

Civ. Pro., § 387.

"Taylor v. Adair, 22 Ia. 279.
6 Coffey v. Greenfield, 55 Calif. 382.
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the fact should be that she was not entitled to the whole of it, but
that the intervenors were severely entitled to a part of it, they could
maintain actions agaiiist her to recover their shares. The fact that
they might, at their election have a remedy against the city would
not deprive them of this right of action. If this is so, why may not
they intervene in this action, in order to have the award apportioned,
and to recover their share? Why should they have to wait until the
money was paid over to the plaintiff, and then sue her?""8
In a recent California case" the Supreme Court held that where
property was attached as belonging to the defendant, a third person
who claimed to own it might properly intervene in the action. Stockholders have been permitted to intervene to defend'an action upon a
note fraudulently executed by the officers of the company, when
the company refused to defend." A subsequent attaching creditor
who has levied on property already levied upon in a prior action, may
intervene to defeat the'lien of the prior levy." The purpose in all
these cases is to simplify litigation and so far as possible dispose of
an entire controversy and the rights involved in it or affected by it
in a single action. But the intervenor's interest must be a legal or
equitable one, and not a mere moral or sentimental interest for or against the record parties. The character of the interest
which the intervenor must possess is well summarized by Mr.
PoMnoY in his work on Code Remedies as follows: "The intervenor's interest must be such that if the original action had never
been commenced, and he had first brought it as the sole plaintiff, he
Would have been entitled to recover in his own name to the extent
at least of a part of the relief sought; or if the action had first been
brought against him as the defendant, he oud -hav-e-beedn able to

,defeat the r'ecovei -f p~rat_j
5.

iii~f'h

CONSTRUCTION OV ACT.

The second section of the judicature Act declares that the entire
Act is remedial in character and as such shall be liberally construed
to effectuate its intents and purposes. This section should have
an important bearing upon the construction to be given and the
scope to be accorded to the foregoing provisions relative to parties,
for it at once frees the court from the shackles of the old rule that
V Smith v. City of St. Paul, 65 Minn. 295.
3 Dennis v. Kolm, 131 Calif. 9i.
WM" ajors v. Taussig, 20 Colo. 44. And see also State v. Holmes, 6o Neb. 39; Fitzwater v. Bank, 62 Kan. 163.
1 McEldowney v. Madden, 124 Calif. 1o.
" 4th Ed., § 324.
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proceedings in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed. It will therefore rest largely with the court to determine
how far the new provisions are to be carried as remedial instruments. The experience of every procedural reform demonstrates
the controlling influence of the court, for no statute can be so clearly worded that its scope and meaning is not largely dependent upon.
the sympathetic, indifferent or hostile attitude of the judiciary. With
a Supreme Court already committed by a long and distinguished
history to the doctrine that the best test of procedure is its efficiency
and convenience rather than its historical regularity, the Judicature
Act may well be expected to mark a new epoch in the administration of the law in Michigan.
(To be Continued)
EDSoN R. SUNDIRLAND.
The Law School, University of Michigan.

THE MICHIGAN JUDICATURE ACT OF 1915.
IV. PLEADINGS.
T~lE
The judicature Act, re-enacting a long-standing statute Of. the
State, makes it the duty of the Supreme Court to enact general
rules of practice for the Circuit Courts with a view to the attainment of the following improvements:
"2. The abolishing of all fictions and unnecessary process and
proceedings."

"3. The simplifying and abbreviating of the pleadings and pro.ceedings."
"6. The remedying of such abuses and imperfections as may be
found to exist in the practice."
"7.

The abolishing of all unnecessary forms and technicalities

in pleading and practice."'
But lest the Supreme Court should misconceive its duty in the
premises, the Act went further and made two radical provisions
respecting pleading, one providing a new test for the sufficiency of3
declarations 2 and the other abolishing demurrers and dilatory pleas.
The Supreme Court, however, took prompt measures to revise and
reform the current rules of pleading, and a complete revision of
the Circuit Court Rules, prepared and proposed by a Committee of
the State Bar Association, was approved and adopted by the Court
as a necessary supplement to the reforms made by the Judicature
Act. So that in dealing with the Act it is quite essential to treat the
new Rules as an integral part of it, and in -the following discussion
the Statute and Court Rules will, be considered together.
I.

THE DECLARATION.

By statute, while the old forms of declarations are permissible,
it is declared that "no declaration shall be deemed insufficient which
shall contain such information as shall reasonably inform the 4defendant of the nature of the case he is called upon to defend."
Pleadings have always served a double function, namely, raising
issues and giving notice, but the former has usually overshadowed
the latter. It was never a valid objection to a pleading that it did
not give sufficient notice, but it was always a fatal defect if it
Ijudicature
'2 Ch. XIV,

Act, Ch. I, § 14.

5 2.

3Ch. XIV, § 4.
4 Chap. XIV, J 2.

e7
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failed to raise an issue. Of course if it raised an issue it usually
gave enough notice, and yet the resort to bills of particulars shows
how frequently this was not true. The two functions are really
different. "Pleadings," says the Supreme Court of Delaware, "are
to apprise the
designed not only to put in issue single points, but
''
parties of what they are to come prepared to try."
This distinction between the notice-giving and the issue-raising
functions of pleadings has been developed in a very interesting
way in Michigan. When the defendant has wished to present an
affirmative defense he has not pleaded in confession and avoidance
as at common law or as is done under the Code, but he has pleaded
it.
the general issue and set up a notice of special defense under
merety
but
sense,
strict
the
in
issue
an
The notice does not raise
gives notice. Even when the trial of the case includes a trial of
the matters involved in the general issue as well as of those in-volved in the notice, at least a portion of the trial is not based upon
ofan issue at all. And when the defendant waives the benefit
the
close,
and
open
to
right
the
the general issue and demands
general issue substantially disappears and the entire trial goes
forward without any issue at all on the pleadings.
This might be claimed -to really involve only a statutory form of
the
issue, on the theory that the allegations in the notice serve
and:
avoidance,
and.
confession
of
plea
a
in
same purpose as those
the statute is merely to be taken as dispensing with a denial of them.
this
Such statutory issues are common under the Codes. But
suffithe
of
test
the
that
explanation is not sound, for the reason
ciency of the notice is not the same as that for a plea in confession
Techand avoidance or an affirmative defense under the Code.
allegations
and
there,
place
no
have
form
legal
of
niceties
nical
are
in the notice cannot be objected to on the ground that they
of
denial
a
that
evidence
of
so far mere conclusions or matters
of
sufficiency
the
of
test
sole
The
issue.
them would not raise an
reaccuracy
"The
information.
give
to
capacity
the notice is its
of
quired in special pleading has never been applied to a notice
view
in
object
very
the
special defense, and to so hold would defeat
if such
in thus simplifying the rules of pleading. It is sufficient
be
twill
that
defense
the
of
plaintiff
the
a notice fairly apprises
6
set up."
For many years our practice has thus demonstrated the feasibility
toof basing litigation upon -pleadings which are drawn solely
course
of
can
it
defenses
to
applied
be
give notice. If this rule can
Reading's Heirs v. State (1833) 1 Harr. 216.
43 Mich.
'Farmers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Crampton, (1880)
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be applied to declarations, for the theory, of allegations is identical
for all the pleadings in the case. If defendants can be permitted
;toemploy pleadings against which only the objection ofsurprise at
the trial can be successfully made, there is no reason why plaintiffs
cannot be allowed to do the same. The rule as to notices of special
defenses has worked admirably, and no lawyer would favor its repeal. Then why not make it general, and apply it to the pleadings
of both parties?
This is just what the Judicature Act has expressly done. "No
declaration shall be deemed insufficient which shall contain such
information as shall reasonably inform the defendant of the nature
of the case he is called upon to defend." Such is the language of
the Act. It is substantially the same language that has long been
applied by our Court to notices of special defenses. Our practice
has thus become symmetrical and uniform, 'and the function of
all pleadings has become primarily that of giving notice. The purpose of pleading has ceased to be the exemplification of the subtilties
of pleader's logic and has become the intelligible disclosure of the
real nature of the respective claims of the parties.
If this sensible and reasonable test is to be substituted for the
old test of the common law, the old forms of declaration ought to
give place to others more in harmony with the new standard of
sufficiency. The cumbersome, discursive, redundant and involved precedents which our local practice books have scrupulously
preserved for professional use, and which conservative' lawyers
could hardly refuse to follow, ought to be supplanted by other more
modern, direct and business-like forms which disclose on their face
a greater regard for efficiency than for conventionality. These
the New Circuit Court Rules have given us. For the first time
the Supreme Court has officially approved a set of pleading forms,
and has offered them to the profession as models to be followed
They are substantially identical with the forms under which all the
litigation of Great Britain has been conducted for more than forty
years.

7

In 1912, when 3 ew Jersey abandoned the Common Law System
of pleading and adopted a new practice act better fitted to modern
needs, a set of official pleading forms was made a part of the rules
of court, and while fewer in number and less representative than
'those which our Supreme Court has adopted, they are, as far as !hey
go, exactly the same kind of forms. In Connecticut the admirable
See Bullen & Leake's Precedents of Pleadings (7th Ed. igiS) where hundreds of
currently used English forms almost exactly conforming to the official Michigan forms,
may be found.
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system for many years in force has involved the use of official
pleading forms issued and approved by the Courts. And in the recent report of the Board of Statutory Consolidation of New York,
prepared by some of the ablest lawyers of that State, one of the
defects in the present system was declared to be the want of official
forms of -pleading. Under the New Circuit Court Rules Michigan:
has patterned after the best thought and practice of the time in
respect to its forms of pleadings.
The problem of inconsistent causes of action and defenses is
expressly taken up in the New Rules, which declare that such
"causes of action or defenses are not objectionable, and when the
party is in doubt as to which of two or more statements of fact
is true he may in separate counts or paragraphs allege or charge
facts, although the same may be inconsistent with other counts or
paragraphs in the same pleading.""
There are two possible ways of solving the problem of inconsistent-causes of action or defenses. One is to allow alternative
pleading of facts in the same count or defense, and the other is
to allow the inconsistent facts to be set up positively in different
counts or paragraphs. The method of using alternative allegations
is the one most in accord with modern ideas of truthfulness in alle-.
gations. Inconsistent allegations do not look frank and honest on
their face. People in their personal affairs who wish to tell the
truth do not tell inconsistent stories, each with absolute positiveness.
They say-that the facts are either this way or that way. No other
form of expression would meet the conscientious scruples of an
honest man. Why, then, should not the pleader do the same? Why
force him to take a position as a pleader that he would never think
of taking as a man? The only reason by which such a course could
be justified is that it is the historic method of the common law,
and nobody is deceived by what a pleader says. It is not, however,
in accord with modern ideas for a pleader to assert what he does
not believe, and if the belief is in the alternative the allegations.
should be in -the same form.
Alternative pleading has been authorized in some jurisdictions by
statute.9 In others it has been sanctioned by the courts without a
statute.10 The New Rules do not expressly authorize it, but there
sCircuit Court Rules, Rule 2i, § 79Kentucky:-See Brown v. IlL Cent. R. R. Co., (1897) 1oo Ky. 525.
See Otrich v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (xg1), 154 Mo. App. 420.
10

Re Morgan (1887) 35 Ch. D. 492; Philips v. Philips (1899)

v. Feaster (191o), 87 S. C..95; Rasmussen v. McKnight (1883)
Moses (igo3) 8x N. Y. App. Div. i99.

Missouri:-

4 Q. B. D. 127; Bank

3 Utah 315; Hasberg v.
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is a seeming discrepancy on the point in the Rules. As originally
prepared by the Committee of the Bar Association, Rule 21, Section 7, expressly authorized alternative pleading, but the Supreme
Court changed it by substituting an authorization of inconsistent
counts or defenses. But when we turn to the authorized pleading
forms, it appears that the Supreme Court retained the alternative
form of allegations as submitted by the Bar Association Committee.
This alternative form is found in forms No. i and No. 31. It
would thus appear that in so wording Rule 21, Section 7, as to
authorize inconsistent counts and defenses, the Supreme Court did
not intend to prohibit or discourage a resort to alternative allegations in proper cases, and for this reason it approved the forms
appropriate to that kind of pleading. The conclusion seems necessary therefore that both methods are open to Michigan pleaders,
and they. may make their allegations in the alternative when in
doubt as to which of two inconsistent facts'is true, or they may
set up each version of the facts in a separate count alleged positively.
2.

JOINDER Or COUNTS.

The question of the right to join counts has always been befogged by historical considerations. Under the common law practice the courts took jurisdiction of cases under the authority conferred by the original writ, and this writ contained a summary of the
case which the plaintiff was proposing to litigate. Obviously, since
there could be but one writ in any case, no counts could be united
in the same declaration which did not fall within the scope of
the case made by the writ. Furthermore, the common law laid
great stress upon singleness of issue, and -hence it looked with distrust upon any joinder of counts which did not all permit of
the same plea.
But under modern conditions in this country neither one of these
objections to a free joinder of counts has any weight. The soletest of the right to join should be convenience. All procedure is
but a means to an end. It seeks to produce in the most direct and
effective way a determination of conflicting rights. Anything
which makes for convenience is generally good; anything which
results in inconvenience is generally bad.
The joinder of counts is, in principle, nothing but consolidation of
actions. No joinder can take place which brings together counts
triable only in different courts or in different jurisdictions. This
is an absolute limitation. Further, a consolidation of actions or

'556,
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joinder of counts is usually productive of no convenience when the
different actions or counts affect different parties. But aside from
,these two restrictions it is very difficult to lay down any definite
rule limiting joinder which will work successfully.
The New York Code of 1848, which has been followed in some
twenty-eight other states, adopted the plan of classifying actions
into about half a dozen classes, and then allowing only those to be
joined which should all fall within some one class. These classes
were arbitrary and were doubtless intended solely as an aid to
convenience in judicial administration, but they have not proved a
great success. Kansas, with its strong tendency to ignore conventionality, after operating for about forty years with this provision,
abolished it a few years ago, and substituted a statute making no
limitation whatever in the right to join causes of action except
identity of parties.1 And the recent Report of the Board of Statatory Consolidation of New York, in proposing an abandonment
of the old joinder statute says:- "This method of prescribing the
causes of action that may be joined has led to great confusion and
to constructions almost without number. In Bliss's New York
Annotated Code there are over eighteen pages of citations under
Section 484 (the Joinder Statute)."
The Judicature Act has made a notable advance in our practice
regarding joinder, without falling into the errors committed by the
Codes. It provides in substance that the plaintiff may join in one
action, either at law or in equity, as many causes of action as he
may have against the defendant, but if it appear that any such causes
of action cannot be conveniently
of together the Court
"may
order separate trials. 2 This disposed
is substantially the rule in England,'13 and has been adopted, though in quite different language,
in the New Jersey Practice Act of I912.14 It is also the rule adopted
by the Supreme Court of the United States for equity cases,' 5 and
has been proposed as one of the new civil practice rules for New
York.'
It has therefore already undergone the test of long use
in England and has commended itself strongly to American legislatures and courts.
"Gen.

St. 9o9, § 5681.
Chap. VIII, § i.
23 Order XVIII, Rule r.
14 N. J. Laws 1912, Chap. 231, § 14.
15U. S. Equity Rules, Rule 26.
16Report of Board. of Statutory Consolidation, Rule iSo.
12
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3. DILATORY DEFENSES.

Demurrers, pleas in abatement and pleas to the jurisdiction are
abolished. Instead of these is substituted a motion to dismiss, or
proper allegations in the answer in equity, or a notice under the
plea at law.
The abolition of these remedies is quite striking at first sight,
but it does not make a very substantial change in the practice.
The difference between a demurrer and a motion to dismiss is
-only in appearance. They serve the same purpose. Demurrers
seem to have acquired a bad reputation of late, for they have been
abolished in England'1 and in New Jersey,18 and in the federal
.courts in equity. 19 The chief objection to them is that they prqduce
delay, and a more summary method of raising points of law is
.desirable. Of course the delay could be avoided by merely allowing them to be set down for argument within a limited time after
being filed. But a motion is a more flexible remedy than a demurrer, because it can not only be directed to the face of the
opponent's pleading but may bring new facts into, the record by
-affidavit. So that the change made in this regard, while not revolutionary, is doubtless good.
But a much more important feature of the new Act is the per.mission offered to raise points of law in the answer or notice
,under the plea. Matters in abatement at law have long been pleadable by way of notice under the general issue, 20 contrary to the
orthodox theory of the common law that a plea in bar was a
waiver of defenses in abatement. But we have never before gone
to the point of permitting demurrers and pleas to the same matter
to be filed at the same time. But under the new Act this is
permissible, as it should be, for there was never any sound reason
for the common law rule forbidding it. The English practice, in
connection with the abolition of demurrers, provides for the raising of points of law in the same pleading in which issues of fact
-are presented, and the new New Jersey Act does the same. Some
American States which have retained the demurrer have by statute offered litigants the same privilege,21 which is of course a
matter not at all dependent on the abolition of demurrers. By
pleading all defenses at the same time, whether they consist of
points of law or matters of fact, much time can be saved. This is
the chief advantage to be gained.
11Order 25.
1912, Chap. 231, Rules § 26.
19U. S. Equity Rules, Rule 29.
"Old Circuit Court Rule (Law) 6.
2'Utah: See State ex. rel. v. Edwards (9o8)
w. Ryan (1897) z19 Cal. 7z.

'sLaws

33 Utah 243; California:

See Hurley
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4.

THE

GENBRAI

ISSUE

AND

NOTICES THEREUNDER.

The Judicature Act has not made any general change of first
importance in the use of the general issue and notices of special
defenses, but the New Rules have introduced a striking innovation,
with the design of extending -still further the underlying idea of
notice as the main purpose of-pleading.
One of the worst abuses of the common law system of pleading
was the use of general issues under which all sorts of special
defenses were admissible. The plaintiff came to court almost absolutely in the dark as to what he was to be called upon to meet.
-Our practice cured this evil to the extent of requiring notice of'
defenses which were in their nature affirmative. -But this only
met half the difficulty. It did not touch the further hardship imposed upon the plaintiff of being kept in ignorance of the natureof the negative defenses which the defendant would rely upon.
The whole declaration was put in issue. It would be an 'unusuat
case where the defendant would really intend to controvert ali
the plaintiff's allegations, but the plaintiff was nevertheless required.
to 'assume that he might do so and to be prepared for attack
anywhere along his whole line.
This use of an unspecified and unrestricted general denial, de-signed and employed largely for the purpose of throwing dust in
the plaintiff's eyes, is parallel to the use of an unspecified general
demurrer. In Michigan an enlightened conception of fair play,
far in advance of that in most other American jurisdictions, has
long condemned the use of a demurrer which did not specify in
22
But
detail the points of attack contemplated by the demurrant.
requiring
rule
supplementary
a
with
up
this
followed
we never
the same specification of points of attack under a general issue.
So that although the defendant might intend to really contest only
one or possibly none of the plaintiff's allegations, the plaintiff was
nevertheless obliged to carry the burden and expense of provingall the allegations of his declaration.
The New Rules have remedied this glaring defect. They provide that where the defendant really intends to take issue on only
a part of the allegations in the plaintiff's declaration, he must point
out that part, and when he does not intend to controvert any of
23
The penalty for failurethe plaintiff's allegations he must say So.
to observe these rules is the taxing against the defendant of the
plaintiff's expenses incurred in proving or preparing to prove
Old Circuit Court Rule (Law) 5, (a).
'Circuit Court Rule 23, § § 7 and 8.
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those parts of his case which the defendant has misled him into
believing were-to be contested at the trial.
These rules will do much to convince the public that litigation
is not a mere game of chance carried on by lawyers at the expense
of their clients. They will, if enforced, limit the scope of the
trial to the real points in controversy, and will save the public
thousands of dollars in court expenses through the saving of time
in the conduct of trials. Courts will be able to do more business,
jurors and witnesses will be less seriously burdened, and the costs
of preparing records for appeal will be materially reduced.
While the exact provisions of these rules are not found in the
practice of any other jurisdiction, similar results are obtained
in a somewhat different way to a limited extent in England and
much more completely in New Jersey.
In England it is provided that "it shall not be sufficient for a.
defendant in his statement of defense to deny generally the grounds
alleged by the statement of claim or for a plaintiff in his reply to
deny generally the grounds-alleged in a defense by way of counterclaim, but each party must deal specifically with each allegation
of fact of which he does not admit the truth, except damages."2
But there is no penalty for making specific denials of matters which
the party does not really intend to controvert, so that this provision
alone would not be sufficient to produce a real disclosure of a party's position. To supplement this another rule is found which
provides that "any party may, by notice in writing, at any time
not later than nine days before -the day for which notice of trial
has been given, call on the other party to admit, for the purposes of
the cause, matter or issue only, any specific fact or facts mentioned
in such notice. And in case of refusal or neglect to admit the
same within six days after service of such notice, or within such
further time as may be allowed by the Court or a Judge, the costs
of proving such fact or facts shall be paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the-result of the cause, matter or
issue may be, unless at the trial or hearing the Court or a Judge
certify that such refusal was reasonable."25
But the burden of obtaining a disclosure is under these rules
thrown on the- party not making the denials, instead of upon the
party who makes them. It is the latter who ought always to tell
what he really intends by them.
In New Jersey the practice is better, and approaches very near
to that set forth in the New Michigan Rules. The court rules
24 Order xg, Rule x7.
23 Order 32, Rule 4.
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attached to the New Practice Act in that state provide'that "Alle.gations or denials, made without reasonable cause, and found untrue, shall subject the party pleading the same to the payment of
-such reasonable expenses, to be taxed by the Court, as may have
been necessarily incurred by the other party, by reason of such
-untrue pleading."26 -This, of course, goes somewhat farther than
.-the Michigan Rules, for the same penalty is applied to a party
who either alleges too much or denies too much. The foregoing
.provision is also supplemented by another which requires denials
to be specific except when the defendant intends in good faith to
2
-controvert all the allegations, in which case they may be general. T
And the New Jersey Act also contains a provision relative to
,express admissions almost exactly like that quoted above from the
English Rules.2 8 It is quite clear, therefore, that the practice is
-not novel, and has been in force in much the same form as we
-have it for three or four years in -New Jersey, with nothing so
,far observable to throw doubt upon its entire success.
5.

RX-EMDY VOR UNCERTAINTY IN

PLIEADING.

The Judicature Act gives no remedy for a defective pleading
,except a motion to dismiss or a plea or answer.

But it is obvious

.-that something corresponding to the common law special demurrer
for uncertainty ought to be available to prevent the too frequent
-claim of sui-prise at the trial. This need has been met by the New
Rules, which provide that "whenever a pleading, at law or in
.equity, is deemed to be indefinite, uncertain or incomplete, a further
-and better statement of the nature of the claim or defense or
-further and better particulars of any matter stated in any pleading
may be ordered on motion, upon such terms as to costs and other-.wise as may be just."2

This is designed to prevent parties from lying in wait for -their
.adversaries at the trial in cases where the pleadings are obviously
-so uncertain as to give the other party insufficient notice. If adequacy of notice is to-be the sole test of sufficiency, as the Judica-:ture Act declares, then unless there is some means of objecting to
the insufficiency prior to the trial there will be many miscarriages
-of justice. And if such means of objecting does exist, it will be
fair and right for the court to hold that on the trial pleadings
21Laws 1912, Chap. 231, Appendix, § x9.
2'Laws 1912, Chap. 231, Appendix, § 40.
28Laws 1912, Chap. 231, § 18.

"Riile 2i, § 8.
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shall be liberally construed from the point of view of notice, forfailure to ask for a better notice may well be deemed a waiver of'
many defects.
The motion for' a further or better statement is the remedy in
use under the English practice, 0 and such a motion is in universaluse under the Codes. Some question has arisen as to the precise
relation between this remedy and that by demand for a bill of
particulars. It would seem that they might well be deemed co-ordinate and concurrent remedies in many cases. In Conover v.
Knight,3" the Supreme Court of Wisconsin said upon this point:"We are not disposed to draw any nice distinction between the functions of an order for a bill of particulars and an order requiringa pleading to be made more definite and certain, for we think such
distinction has no tangible existence in reason or law.' 32 Clearlythere are many cases where no demand of particulars under thel
old practice could successfully be made, but where the pleading is
nevertheless defective as a notice. In such cases a remedy now
exists by motion. If it is the defendant's notice of special defense
which thus falls short of the prescribed standard, the remedy is:
one unknown to our former practice in any form, for it has always.
been the rule that an objection to evidence was the only way to,
reach a-defective notice, and that no means existed for testing the,
sufficiency of the notice at a preliminary stage.3 3 Doubtless the
use of motions for uncertainty may become a source of abuse, and
in many jurisdictions they are employed with such frequency and
for so little reason that they have become a real nuisance. But
our Rule provides an effective cure for improper use, in the discretion given the court to impose terms, and if the trial courtsrefuse to allow this remedy to become an instrument for annoyance and delay it should prove to be a very convenient and useful
additioft to our practice.
EDSON R. SUNDERIAND.

The Law School,
University of Michigan.
3Order XIX, Rule 7.
" (1893)

84 Wis. 639.

"1This statement is cited with approval in Stocklen v. Barrett-(xgxx) 58 Ore. 281"Rosenbury v. Angell (z859) 6 Mich. 508.

